

masterminding the
in Washington?
chief of counterintel-
Klugin was Angleton's
about 1968, and such
end of his tour of duty
at general in the history
and then the chief of
intelligence service, the First
in his mid-thirties, these
personal ability, his loyalty
Angleton. Nothing less than
notions, and one would
counterintelligence service,
operations against the Soviet
initiated and controlled the
check for sixteen years the
Red Navy; and he also
the U.S. manufacturers

vik *nomenklatura*, Kalugin
and University's philology
ist. After graduation he
d for the penetration of
thaw in American-Soviet
University in New York City,
the Philby case, Gennady
d warfare branch of the
an important figure in
served for ten years as

1960s and was trained as
the United States. Presum-
conditions, for Kalugin
as a spy while working as
s, I believe, I successfully
vity."⁴

er to develop a new cover,
radio reporter. In 1965 he
rt and became, he claimed,
JSA and, when the resident
g time."⁵

The term "monster plot" was CIA in origin and scornful in meaning, and at the center of it was Angleton, who had acquired a large reputation and even larger power. No overseas appointment could be made without his approval; no operations could be undertaken without his assent, and he alone, except for the CIA's signal master, saw all the agency's messages. One reason was that only Angleton had the means and the knowledge to verify the character of the appointee, to assess the security situation surrounding the operations, and to gauge the worth of the intelligence being received. Moreover, it was necessary for him in the daily exercise of his work to know what all the other chiefs of the agency were doing. The Counterintelligence Division became subject to his direction alone, and few if any directors of Central Intelligence interfered with it, largely because few understood his craft or had the time to study the endlessly complex games in which he was involved. He was completely trusted by his chiefs; few if any of his colleagues or subordinates dared question his work. Angleton became a law unto himself between 1963 and 1971, the main years of the monster plot.

But if he was a brilliant man, he possessed serious intellectual weaknesses. Cleveland Cram, a Harvard Ph.D. and a senior CIA officer for thirty years, was called back to the CIA from retirement in 1977 and spent four years researching and writing the official but internal history of Angleton's career on the basis of unrestricted access to the CIA's files. When done, the history consisted of eleven volumes on legal-size paper. Cram had dealt with British affairs for much of his CIA career and served as deputy chief of mission in London during the main period of the monster plot. A man of calm, measured judgment, and much respected in his trade, during his investigation of Angleton and his conduct of office Cram formed the view that Angleton was "obsessively theoretical, obsessively ambitious, and obsessed about Philby." When Philby defected, Angleton suffered "severe psychic damage." And as Cram also remarked, "If Philby had achieved nothing else in the Soviet service he would have earned his keep by the peculiar thralldom he obtained over Angleton's thinking."⁶ Cram's judgment is shared by Angleton's wife. Cicely Angleton told how Philby's disappearance affected her husband "terribly, deeply — it was a bitter blow he never forgot."⁷

It will be recalled that when Philby was recruited into the Soviet service in 1934, he was required by his case officer, Arnold Deutsch, a psychologist, to write appreciations of all significant persons he met. "You will produce a lot of rubbish," Deutsch told him, "but one useful page will be worth lots of waste paper." By now, the early 1960s, these

ANTHONY CAVE BROWN

TREASON IN THE BLOOD

*H. St. John Philby, Kim Philby,
and the
Spy Case of the Century*



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